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C
orporate internal investments in inno-
vative activities, including research and
development, have often been maligned
for their ineffectiveness (Jensen 1993).
Over the past forty years, corporations
have attempted to capture the value
from waves of technology and innovation. But dur-
ing much of this time, corporations saw young, nim-
ble start-ups capitalize on opportunities that the
corporations saw first. 
Why have corporations had difficulty bringing
innovations to market? Many of the best ideas have
languished, unused, whether because of internal
resistance (for example, from managers who did not
want to see a product launched that competed with
one of their offerings) or an inability to execute on
the initial insight. In other cases, defecting employ-
ees started new firms that turned those ideas into
blockbuster commercial successes. The achieve-
ments of fast-growing technology firms such as
Microsoft and Cisco Systems—many of which relied
on acquisitions rather than on internal research
and development (R&D) for the bulk of their new
ideas—also made conventional approaches to inno-
vation look lackluster by comparison. In response to
these factors, many corporations entered the ven-
ture capital market in hopes of spurring their own
innovative capacity.
Corporations have good reason to explore new
ways of stimulating innovation. All too often, their
investments in traditional R&D laboratories have gen-
erated paltry returns as researchers have focused on
incremental product advances or on academic ideas
with little relevance to the corporation (Henderson
1993; Henderson and Cockburn 1996). Worse, even
when these corporate laboratories managed to come
up with truly innovative ideas, other organizations—
especially venture-backed start-ups—have some-
times seized the opportunity to commercialize them.
But how can companies best stimulate innovation
in a corporate setting? The venture capital industry’s
success may be difficult to replicate. Though total
disbursements from the venture industry during
1975–2000 proved considerably less than the R&D
spending of either IBM or General Motors alone,
venture-backed firms have scored remarkable suc-
cesses (Reinganum 1989; Lerner 1997).
This paper explores the history, structure, and
performance of corporate venture programs in the
United States. It chronicles the cyclical nature of
the industry over the past forty years, a time during
which corporate venture capital programs were often
halted before the full fruits from the investment
activity could be realized. This study shows that the
corporate venture capital market in the United States
has gone through three waves of activity that track
the overall independent venture capital market. 
The paper next explores the experience of corpo-
rate venture investment using a detailed microlevel
data set. The analysis finds that such investments
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neurs were often concerned about protecting their
intellectual property and wanted to avoid alliances
that could threaten their position. For example, a
small high-technology company in a precarious
financial situation might be reluctant to approach
IBM or Sony directly for funding. Therefore, the very
companies in which these corporations wanted to
invest were usually the ones that never made it to
their doorsteps.
Dedicated external fund. Other corporations
placed investment capital in a dedicated fund that
existed as a separate entity outside the corporation.
This structure did not solve many entrepreneurs’
concerns because they still needed to feel comfort-
able with forming an alliance with the particular
corporation sponsoring the fund. Since corpora-
tions were able to use only dedicated external funds
to attract entrepreneurs that wanted to be aligned
with them, the corporations were not able to allo-
cate assets across industry areas besides their own
even though diversification through pooled invest-
ments might have produced better risk management
and higher financial returns. In addition, a dedicated
external fund often frustrated a corporation’s desire
to gain strategic leverage with start-up companies.
The corporation’s relationship was too distant for
the corporation’s employees to work closely with
the entrepreneurs.
Passive limited partner in a venture fund.
Existing venture funds gave corporations the oppor-
tunity to become passive limited partners and make
diversified investments in entrepreneurial compa-
nies.1 The venture capitalists managing these funds
typically had little incentive to involve corporations
in early investments. Instead, the venture capitalists
would send corporate limited partners deals at later
stages for passive investment at fairly high valua-
tions.2 In addition, this structure did not allow cor-
porations to achieve strategic objectives since the
corporations, as passive investors, did not have direct
relationships with the entrepreneurs. The “informa-
tion flow” to corporations depended on the venture
capitalists’ goodwill.
The History of Corporate Venturing Investments
T
he first corporate venture funds emerged in the
mid-1960s—about two decades after the initial
institutional venture capital funds formed.3 Since that
time, corporate venturing has undergone three boom-
and-bust cycles that closely track the independent
venture capital sector. Corporations have typically
entered the corporate venture capital market after
the independent sector showed signs of success
(Gompers and Lerner 1998a). All too often, however,
are increasingly made in related industries—that is,
over time, the strategic fit between corporate ven-
ture capital investments and the parent corpora-
tion’s business has increased. In addition, contrary
to previous assumptions, corporate venture capital
investments have, on average, been more successful
than independent venture capital investments. This
success is exclusively associated with strategic
corporate venture investments—that is, nonrelated
investments have much lower success rates. This
study concludes that corporations appear to be learn-
ing many of the best practices from the independent
venture capital sector. The success of corporate
venture investing has increased over time.
Types of Corporate Venturing
L
arge corporations have long been attracted to
venture capital investing. Many of these efforts
have been motivated by a desire to gain access to
cutting-edge technologies for strategic reasons.
Sometimes these strategic goals far outweighed any
consideration of financial return for corporate
investors, allowing financial investors to treat these
corporations as later-stage, valuation-insensitive
investors. This behavior led many independent ven-
ture capitalists to introduce early-stage technology
companies to corporate investors only during later
rounds of financing, when portfolio companies
required large amounts of cash raised at extremely
high valuations to preserve the venture capitalists’
percentage ownership. This practice created situa-
tions in which corporations invested in companies
that were often significantly overvalued and made it
difficult for corporate investors to achieve accept-
able financial returns. As a result, many corporate
investors reached the conclusion that it was not
possible to achieve both financial and strategic goals
in doing early-stage technology investing.
Corporations used several models to achieve their
strategic and financial objectives for venture capital
investments. Each of these models, however, created
problems that ultimately caused corporations to fail
to reach their goals. 
Internal corporate venture group. Some cor-
porations created internal corporate venture groups
to analyze venture capital opportunities and make
investments. Problems typically arose with this strat-
egy because it limited deal flow to those companies
that wanted to be associated with that particular
corporation. Entrepreneurs were limited by this
structure because, while they could receive excel-
lent depth of assistance in the corporation’s area of
expertise, they were forced to sacrifice breadth of
available resources. In addition, early-stage entrepre-1. For a discussion of typical independent venture capital fund structures, see Gompers and Lerner (1996, 1999).
2. For a discussion of staging and its implications for investors, see Gompers (1995).
3. This history of corporate venture capital is based on Fast (1978); Hardymon, DeNino, and Salter (1983); Venture Economics
(1986); and assorted press accounts. It is largely based on the history of corporate venture capital presented in Gompers and
Lerner (1998b).
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corporations overbuilt capacity without carefully
thinking out the implications (Block and Ornati
1987). This strategy invariably led to retrenchment. 
The first wave. As traditional venture capital
funds fueled the success of corporations such as
Digital Equipment Corporation, Memorex, Raychem,
and Scientific Data Systems, large companies took
notice, reviewing these successes as new potential
opportunities. Large companies began establishing
divisions that emulated venture capitalists. During
the late 1960s and early 1970s, more than 25 per-
cent of the Fortune 500 firms set up such programs
(Rind 1981).
At one end of the spectrum, large corporations
financed new firms that were already receiving ven-
ture capital from independent venture capital orga-
nizations. Most of these efforts, such as General
Electric’s Business Development Services, Inc.,
invested directly in start-ups. This strategy let man-
agers tailor their firms’ portfolios to their particular
technological or business needs. In other cases,
the corporations simply provided funds to a separate
venture capital firm. This separate firm would in turn
invest the money in entrepreneurial organizations.
At the other end of the spectrum, projects such
as DuPont Corporation’s Development Department
and Ralston Purina’s New Venture Division sought to
promote new ventures internally. These programs
encouraged the companies’ own product engineers
and scientists to forge ahead with their innova-
tions—and provided financial, legal, and marketing
support. In some cases, these units were separate
legal entities, which at times also had outside equity
investors. More typically, however, the corporate
parent retained ownership of the program.
In 1973, the market for new public offerings—the
primary avenue through which venture capitalists
exit successful investments—dried up as small tech-
nology stocks experienced very poor returns. Returns
of independent venture funds shrank, and commit-
ments to the independent venture capital sector fell.
Corporations, in light of the declining market, began
scaling back their own venturing initiatives. The typi-
cal corporate venture program begun in the late
1960s was dissolved after just four years.
The second wave. The independent venture
industry’s prospects brightened again in the late
1970s and early 1980s. Two regulatory changes had
a dramatic impact on venture capital commitments
(Gompers and Lerner 1998c). First, the top capital
gains tax rate was reduced in 1978. Second, the
Department of Labor eased pension investment
restrictions in 1979, allowing pension managers to
invest substantial amounts into venture capital
funds. In addition, several new technological innova-
tions, including personal computer hardware and
software, provided an opportunity for new compa-
nies to exploit new markets. The flow of funding into
the venture capital industry grew, and the number of
active venture organizations proliferated. 
Corporate venturing increased shortly thereafter.
By 1986 corporate funds managed $2 billion, or
nearly 12 percent of the total pool of venture capi-
tal. Whereas the earlier wave of corporate venturing
had taken aim at a broad range of investment
opportunities, now high-tech and pharmaceutical
companies—such as Control Data, EG&G, Eli Lilly,
and Monsanto—led the charge.
The boom of the early 1980s, however, was soon
followed by another retrenchment. In 1987, the
stock market crashed and the market for new pub-
lic offerings again deflated. As in the past, returns
and fund-raising by independent partnerships
shrank as well. Chart 1 provides a profile of this
relationship. This time, corporations scaled back
their commitment to venture investing even more
dramatically. By 1992 the number of corporate ven-
ture programs had fallen by one-third, and their
capital under management represented only 5 per-
cent of a much smaller venture pool.
The third wave. The venture capital industry
expanded once again in the late 1990s, fueled in large
part by the highly visible successes of telecommu-
nications and Internet-related companies. As rates
The venture capital industry expanded once
again in the late 1990s, fueled in large part
by the highly visible successes of telecommu-















































































Venture Capital Fund-Raising and Returns through 1994



















































































Venture Capital Fund-Raising and Returns through 2000
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of return on venture capital investments rose, corpo-
rations once again became attracted to the oppor-
tunity of corporate venturing. Chart 2 graphs the
pace of venture capital fund-raising through 2001
and median rates of return on venture capital invest-
ments through 2000. The graph shows the dramatic
expansion in returns along with the unprecedented
rise in fund-raising. During this period, many corpo-
rations had decided to reevaluate the innovation
process itself. For much of the century, large corpo-
rations had typically relied on central R&D labora-
tories to crank out new product ideas. Now, these
organizations began exploring other ways to access
new ideas—including joint ventures, acquisitions,
and university-based collaborations. Corporate ven-
ture programs gave corporations the opportunity to
capitalize on these relationships.
The rapid diffusion of the Internet and its power
to either enhance or cannibalize “bricks-and-mortar”
businesses intensified this interest. Corporations
everywhere realized that e-commerce presented both
an opportunity and a threat. However, many organi-
zations lacked the internal resources to explore these
new opportunities. Corporate venturing provided
one solution. For example, the Tribune Company, the
Sony Corporation, and United Parcel Service all insti-
tuted efforts to invest in on-line businesses.
Finally, numerous venture capital groups, look-
ing for strategic-partnering opportunities, expressed
interest in collaborating with corporations. In earlier
years, traditional venture investors had approached
corporate investors with a mix of caution and skep-
ticism. The waxing and waning of corporate inter-
est—which historically had fluctuated more wildly
than cycles in the venture industry had—made many
venture capitalists nervous.
But as the venture capital sector grew increasingly
crowded in the late 1990s, the venture community
adopted a different attitude. Venture capitalists
increasingly saw corporate investments as a potential
strategic advantage. And a new focus on revolu-
tionary business strategies—such as customer-
relationship management—woke up venture groups
to their own limitations. A corporate partner, some
venture firms surmised, might provide the knowl-
edge and experience that venture organizations
needed to improve their own skills and profes-
sionalism. Such groups forged partnerships with
corporations, not only accepting money from them
as investors but also structuring unique collabora-




orporate venture capital activity is difficult to
measure, but Chart 3 provides some measure
of the level of activity. Chart 3 graphs the number
of corporate venture capital programs announced
publicly by Fortune 100 companies. The three his-
torical “waves” show up prominently in the graph.
The  number of programs established during the
1962–98 period totals well above 100. Though not








Number of Fortune 100 Venturing Programs Announced
Source: Based on Gee (1994) as updated by the authors using press accounts in the Corporate Venturing Report and elsewhere.6 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2002
company Web pages, and telephone contacts with
venture investors. VentureOne then collects infor-
mation about the businesses through interviews
with venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. Among
the data collected are the names of the investors,
the amount and valuation of the venture financings,
and the industry, history, and current status of the
firm. Data on the firms are updated and validated
through monthly contacts with investors and firms.5
VentureOne then markets the database to venture
funds and corporate business development groups
(see Gompers and Lerner 2000 for a detailed dis-
cussion of the database).
For this analysis, the VentureOne data were sup-
plemented when necessary. Some firms in the
VentureOne sample were missing information, such
as an assignment to one of the 103 VentureOne
industry classes or information on the firm’s start
date. To determine this information, a variety of ref-
erence sources were consulted, including Corporate
Technology Information Service’s Corporate Tech-
nology Directory (1996), Dun’s Marketing Services’
Million Dollar Directory (1996), Gale Research’s
Ward’s Business Directory of U.S. Private and
Public Companies (1996), National Register Pub-
lishing Company’s Directory of Leading Private
Companies (1996), and a considerable number of
state and industry business directories in the col-
lections of Harvard Business School’s Baker Library
and the Boston Public Library. Several electronic
databases were also employed: the Company
Intelligence and Database America compilations
available through LEXIS’s COMPANY/USPRIV library
and the American Business Disk CD-ROM directory.
The investors in the VentureOne database were
diverse. They included individuals, institutional
investors such as pension funds, traditional inde-
pendent venture funds (such as Kleiner, Perkins,
Caufield & Byers), and funds sponsored by corpo-
rations, financial institutions, and government bodies.
In order to understand the impact of organizational
structure, many of the analyses below concentrate
on two types of funds: independent venture part-
nerships and corporate funds. As discussed above,
other hybrid venture funds, such as those affiliated
with commercial and investment banks, were elimi-
nated because many of these closely resembled tra-
ditional venture organizations. 
To identify independent and corporate venture
capital organizations, the analysis used an unpub-
lished database of venture organizations assembled
by Venture Economics’ Investors Services Group.
Venture Economics is a unit of Securities Data
Company and tracks the venture capital industry. The
all corporations established venturing programs
during these decades, many that did often set up
more than one. In addition, a single company might
abandon and revive a series of such programs.
Another indicator of the size of the corporate ven-
turing effort can be seen in Table 1, which shows the
fifteen largest corporate venture capital programs in
2000 and their capital under management. The table
shows that the types of firms engaged in corporate
venturing come from a diverse set of industries.
Many are high-technology leaders in their fields,
such as Intel and Siemens. Others are relatively
low-technology or financial companies, including
Comdisco, Time Warner, and Visa International.
The overall scope of corporate venture activity
over recent years is shown in Table 2, which com-
piles the number and (in latter years) the size of
venture investments made directly by corporations.
These numbers do not include cases in which com-
panies committed capital to independent venture
groups, which then invested the funds. Nor do they
reflect instances in which a financial services orga-
nization or a subsidiary of an operating corporation
(for instance, Goldman Sachs or GE Capital) made
an investment. The table demonstrates the tremen-
dous growth of corporate venturing during the third
wave. The number of corporate venture invest-
ments increased nearly twenty-fold over sixteen
years, and the amount of corporate venture invest-




ata description. VentureOne, established in
1987, collects data on firms that have obtained
venture capital financing. The VentureOne database
used in this analysis includes firms that have
received early-stage equity financing from venture
capital organizations, corporate venture capital pro-
grams, and other organizations.
The companies are initially identified from a
wide variety of sources, including trade publications,
In addition to strategic fit, market knowl-
edge, and resources, the way a corporation
approaches its venture program influences
its chances of success.4. Because many corporations do not report their private investments in entrepreneurial firms, these figures should be regarded
as conservative estimates of the level of corporate venture capital activity. The true level would be higher.
5. Information about the financing of private firms is typically not revealed in public documents, and investors and entrepre-
neurs may consider this to be sensitive information. VentureOne seeks to overcome this reluctance by emphasizing that its
database also helps firms obtain financing. In particular, firms can alert investors whether they intend to seek further private
financing or intend to go public in upcoming months.
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organization was known as Capital Publishing when
it was established in 1961 to prepare a newsletter
on federally chartered small business investment
companies (SBICs). Since 1977 the company has
maintained a database on venture partnerships,
which includes over 2,000 venture capital funds,
SBICs, and related organizations. The Investors
Services Group database is used in preparation of
directories, such as the Venture Economics annual
volume Venture Capital Performance. The data-
base is compiled from information provided by ven-
ture capitalists and institutional investors. This
analysis excluded from either classification a vari-
ety of other organizations that make private equity
investments, including individual investors, SBICs,
funds sponsored by banks and other financial insti-
tutions, and funds associated with financial sub-
sidiaries of nonfinancial corporations (such as
General Electric Capital). To determine whether a
company was a nonfinancial corporation, the firm
directories noted above were consulted to deter-
mine the main lines of business in the year of the
investment and thus draw as sharp a contrast as
possible between corporate and independent funds.
In some cases, it was difficult to ascertain if an
investor was a corporate venture organization.
Some U.S. and several European companies invest
in companies through traditional venture capital
partnerships. For example, Eastman Kodak not
only makes direct equity investments but also invests
through a partnership called Aperture Partners, in
which it is the sole limited partner. While many of
these cases were identified for this analysis, some
affiliations may have been missed. In other cases,
independent venture organizations also cater to
corporate investors. A prominent example is Advent,
a Boston-based company that organizes comingled
funds for financial investors and other funds for
Capital under
Corporate sponsor management















Note: The estimated capital under management is shown in mil-
lions of current dollars in 2000. If the corporation organizes mul-
tiple programs, these are consolidated. Some corporations do
not make formal commitments in advance to their venture pro-
grams or do not disclose the size of these commitments. These
firms are not included on the list. Among the largest corporate
venture capital programs falling into these categories are those
of Cisco, Dell, Johnson & Johnson, and Microsoft. 
Source: Asset Alternatives (2000)
TABLE 1
Corporate Venture Capital Fund



















Note: The series reporting number of investments before 1995
and in and after 1995 may not be strictly comparable. For 1995
and after, the dollar volume of these investments (in millions of
2000 dollars) is also reported.
Source: Asset Alternatives (2000)
TABLE 2
Number of Corporate Venture 
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VentureOne has sought to “back-fill” its database
with information on earlier venture investments,
its coverage of the 1970s and early 1980s is poor.
Furthermore, there was concern that VentureOne’s
methodology may have introduced selection biases.
While the database does not include all venture
investments between 1983 and 1994, it provides a
reasonable view of the activity in the industry dur-
ing this period.6 Investments made after 1994 were
not included because I wish to assess the outcomes
of the investments: it may take several years until
the fate of venture-backed firms is clear. I also elim-
inated a variety of investments outside the scope of
this analysis, such as purchases of shares of publicly
traded firms and other financings. 
Summary statistics. After presenting an over-
view of the sample, I undertake empirical analyses
of the ultimate success of corporate and other ven-
ture investments.
Table 3 provides an overview of the sample by
year. After the deletions noted above, the sample
consists of 32,364 investments. Investments by
independent venture funds represent over one-half
of the total transactions in the sample. Corporate
venture investments represent a much smaller share,
about 6 percent. Chart 4 presents the fraction of
investments that are corporate venture capital
investments by year. Because on average about four
investors participate in each financing round, the
number of rounds, 8,506, is significantly smaller. In
single corporate limited partners. From the Venture-
One database, it is usually difficult to determine
whether the private equity group is investing from
its traditional partnerships or from one of its cor-
porate funds.
Finally, the corporate venture capital investments
were characterized by the degree of fit between the
corporation and the portfolio firm. From informa-
tion in the corporate annual reports for the 1983,
1989, and 1994 fiscal years, investments were clas-
sified as to whether there was a direct fit between
one of the corporation’s lines of business during the
period and the portfolio firm, whether there was
an indirect relationship, or whether there was no
apparent relationship. In the analyses below, invest-
ments are denoted as having a strategic fit only if
there was a direct relationship between a line of
business of the corporate parent and the portfolio
firm. The results are robust to expanding the defin-
ition to include indirectly related transactions as
well: for example, when a corporate fund invests in
a firm that is a potential supplier to or customer of
the corporate parent. Not all investments were clas-
sified. In some cases, the relationship could not be
determined. In others, only the proximate annual
reports could be obtained; in particular, it was diffi-
cult to obtain the 1983 and 1989 annual reports for
many of the foreign firms.
The analysis was limited to investments in pri-
vately held firms between 1983 and 1994. While
Number of investments Number of Dollar
Total Corporate VC Independent VC rounds amount
1983 1,841 53 1,013 436 2,219
1984 2,249 91 1,206 550 2,905
1985 2,593 139 1,382 625 2,910
1986 2,557 129 1,381 592 2,394
1987 2,675 152 1,397 642 3,065
1988 2,599 179 1,385 611 2,687
1989 2,866 202 1,490 720 3,069
1990 2,826 233 1,455 784 3,640
1991 2,890 249 1,472 757 3,207
1992 3,166 214 1,699 911 3,891
1993 3,118 198 1,586 931 4,532
1994 2,984 193 1,601 947 4,973
Total 32,364 2,032 17,067 8,506 39,492
Note: The table depicts the number of venture capital investments in the VentureOne sample by year between 1983 and 1994 as well as the
number of financing rounds (a round may consist of several investments by different investors) and the aggregate amount of funding disbursed
(in millions of 1994 dollars). Similar tabulations of the number of investments are presented for corporate and independent venture funds.
Source: VentureOne
TABLE 3
Distribution of the Sample6. See Gompers and Lerner (2000) for an analysis of the comprehensiveness of the VentureOne database over time. Concerns
about selection biases are addressed by repeating the analyses below using observations from only 1988 to 1994, when
VentureOne’s coverage of the industry was much more comprehensive. The results are little changed. 
7. The reader may note that the dollar amounts reported here are greater in some years than the cumulative disbursements from
venture capital funds reported elsewhere (for example, Kortum and Lerner 1998). This disparity reflects the fact that the
VentureOne data represent total financings from all sources for privately held venture-backed firms rather than just funds
from venture capital organizations. 
8. See the appendix for definitions of stages, regions, and industries.
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the analyses below, patterns are analyzed on both
the investment and round level.7
Table 4 provides a comparison of four categories
of investments: the total sample, investments by
corporate and independent venture capital organi-
zations, and corporate investments in which there
was a strategic fit between the parent and the port-
folio firm. In general, the corporate investments
closely resemble those of the other funds:
• Status at the time of investment. Corporate funds
tend to invest slightly less frequently in start-up
and mature private firms. Instead, they are dispro-
portionately represented among companies in the
middle stages, such as “development” or “beta.”8
• Location of the firm. The sample dispropor-
tionately includes investments in firms based in
California. This idiosyncrasy reflects VentureOne’s
greater coverage of this region, particularly in
the early years (see Gompers and Lerner 2000
for a discussion). While corporate venture invest-
ments as a whole are slightly more common in
California than other venture investments, corpo-
rate invest-ments with a strong strategic fit are
more frequent elsewhere.
• Industry of the firm. Venture capital investments
tend to focus on a few high-technology industries.
This pattern is even stronger for corporate ven-
ture investments with a strategic focus.
• Maturity of the firm and investment charac-
teristics. Corporate venture funds tend to invest
in later and larger financing rounds and in slightly
older firms than other venture funds do.
Trends and determinants of investment




















Fraction of All Investments That Are Corporate Venture Investments
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nies is critical to determining whether corporate
investments can add value.
Chart 5 shows the fraction of the corporate ven-
ture capital investments that are made in related
industries. One surprising observation is that a large
fraction of investment is in related industries. In
each year of investment, at least 68 percent of
investments made by corporate venture capital
groups are in companies in a related industry. It also
determinants of whether corporate venture capital
investments are made in related industries or not.
As the previous discussion made clear, many corpo-
rate venture capital efforts have failed when they
made investments in companies in totally unrelated
markets. It is often believed that large existing play-
ers in an existing market can add value to new
entrants. Understanding when and how corporate
venture groups choose to invest in related compa-
Entire Corporate Corporate VC and Independent
sample VC only strategic fit VC only
Status at time of investment
Start-up 9.8 7.1 6.4 10.4
Development 30.5 33.6 35.9 31.2
Beta 4.1 5.5 6.4 4.1
Shipping 45.5 44.4 42.9 44.8
Profitable 7.6 6.9 5.6 7.3
Restart 2.4 2.5 2.8 2.3
Location of firm
All western United States 59.7 63.7 59.6 60.8
California 51.6 53.7 51.3 52.7
All eastern United States 24.1 25.2 29.1 23.4
Massachusetts 12.8 14.0 16.5 12.6
Industry of firm
Medical 25.5 25.9 24.2 24.2
Computer hardware 16.7 17.0 16.2 16.8
Communications 14.5 14.2 22.1 15.5
Computer software/on-line services 15.1 15.1 14.0 16.2
Other 28.1 27.9 23.5 27.3
Round of investment
Mean 2.4 2.8 2.9 2.4
Median 2332
Age of firm at time of investment
Mean 3.9 4.0 4.2 3.8
Median 3.0 3.3 3.4 2.8
Amount invested in venture round
Mean 6.1 6.2 6.0 5.7
Median 4.3 4.5 4.7 4.2
Note: The sample consists of 32,364 investments in privately held venture-backed firms between 1983 and 1994. The table presents the
stage of the firm’s development at the time of the investment, the geographic location of the firm, the industry of the firm, the ordinal rank
of the venture round, the age of the firm at the time of the investment (in years), and the amount of the investment in the financing round
(in millions of 1994 dollars). Separate tabulations are presented for investments by corporate venture firms, corporate funds where there
was a strategic fit between the parent and portfolio firms, and independent venture funds.
Source: VentureOne
TABLE 4
Characteristics of Firms at the Time of Investment9. For a discussion of return in the venture capital industry, see Venture Economics (1988, 1997).
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appears that the fraction of the investments made
in related industries has increased over the sample
period. By the end of the sample, between 76 per-
cent and 77 percent of the investments were being
made in related industries.
Table 5 undertakes a regression analysis to under-
stand the determinants of investment relatedness.
The dependent variable is a dummy that equals one
if the corporate investment is in a related industry.
The independent variables include the age of the
firm, a time trend to understand whether the rate of
related investments have increased over time, the
stage of development of the company, and a dummy
variable that equals one if the company is headquar-
tered in Massachusetts or California.
Not surprisingly, the probability of a corporate
investment being made in a related industry
increases over time. In fact, each year the proba-
bility of a related investment increases by 3.5 per-
cent. It therefore appears that corporations were
learning about the value of related investments dur-
ing the decade.
It also appears that investments in early-stage
companies are more likely to be in a related indus-
try than investments in later-stage companies. Firms
in the development stage or the beta stage are sig-
nificantly more likely to be in related industries. This
tendency is also encouraging. Existing players in an
industry can provide significant value to young,
entrepreneurial firms. Large corporations are also
likely to get the most value from investing in the
younger start-ups.
Finally, there are interesting geographical differ-
ences in the rate of related investments. Corporate
venture investments in Massachusetts are far more
likely to be in related industries than are invest-
ments in California or in the rest of the country. The
rate of related investments in California is no differ-
ent than in the rest of the country. Perhaps the types
of venture capital firms in Massachusetts create an
environment that is more accepting of corporate
investments by industry leaders.
Success of venture investments. Even though
these complex motives—and benefits—make it
hard to compare the success of corporate versus
independent venturing, a pattern does emerge if
one examines the data. In fact, in making a compar-
ison, let’s look only at corporate venture invest-
ments made between 1983 and 1994 to ensure that
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It might be thought that these results are just
consequences of the fact that corporate groups
often invest in later financing rounds. By this point
in many investee firms’ development, uncertainties
have cleared up and prospects have brightened. As
it turns out, the same results ensued even when
controls for a portfolio firm’s age and profitability at
the time of the original investment are added.
The success is not uniform, as the final column of
the table reveals. The success of a venturing effort
varies with the “tightness” of fit between the corpo-
ration and the portfolio firm—that is, whether the
corporate parent and the investee are in the same
line of business. To assess this fit, one can examine
corporate annual reports and classified investments.
The success of a corporate program depends on the
presence of a direct, strategic overlap between cor-
porate parent and investee. As just one illustration,
the probability of going public by the end of the
sample period is 39 percent for companies that had
this kind of alignment compared with much lower
percentages for nonaligned firms. 
To address this concern, I examine these patterns
in a regression framework in Table 7. I estimate logit
regressions, alternatively using each investment and
each financing round as observations. I seek to
explain the probability that the investment had gone
public by the spring of 1998 or the probability that the
The status of the firms in the spring of 1998 is
determined from the VentureOne database. Table 6
presents the outcomes for four classes of investors
as well as tests of the statistical significance of the
differences between them. Firms backed by corpo-
rate venture groups are significantly more likely to
have gone public than those financed by other orga-
nizations and are less likely to have been liquidated.
These differences are particularly strong for those
investments in which there was a strategic tie
between the corporate parent and the portfolio firm.
These comparisons may be influenced, however, by
differences between the firms backed by corporate
and other venture investors.
The evidence is striking: In more than 30,000
investments into entrepreneurial firms by venture
capital organizations of all types, corporate efforts
appear to be at least as successful as those backed
by independent venture organizations (using such
criteria as the probability of a portfolio firm’s going
public). As Table 6 shows, 35 percent of the invest-
ments by corporate funds went to companies that
had gone public by the end of the sample period as
opposed to 31 percent for independent funds. The
differences persist even when different criteria for
success are used: for instance, firms that went pub-
lic or were acquired at a valuation that was at least
three times that of the original investment. 
Was the corporate investment
in a related industry?
Age of firm at time of financing 0.0105 [1.16] 0.0116 [1.28]
Time trend 0.0351 [2.38] 0.0358 [2.42]
Firm is in development stage? 0.524 [2.96] 0.506 [2.86]
Firm is in beta stage? 0.697 [3.02] 0.6860 [2.97]
Firm is in shipping stage? 0.184 [1.02] 0.179 [0.99]
Firm is in profitable stage? –0.180 [–0.72] –0.176 [–0.70]
Firm is in restart stage? 0.456 [1.54] 0.463 [1.56]
Firm based in California? 0.098 [1.05]
Firm based in Massachusetts? 0.362 [2.92]
Log likelihood –2,878.1 –2,880.8
χ2-statistic 67.71 70.01
p-value 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 2,032 2,032
Note: The sample in the regressions consists of 2,032 corporate investments in privately held, venture-backed firms between 1983 and
1994. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one if the firm is in an industry that is related to the parent of the cor-
poration sponsoring the venture investment. Independent variables include the age of the firm at the time of the investment, a time trend,
firms based in California and Massachusetts, the status of the firm at the time of the investment, the industry of firm (not reported), and a
constant (not reported). All dummy variables take on the value of one if the answer to the posed question is in the affirmative. Absolute
t-statistics are reported in brackets.
Source: VentureOne
TABLE 5
Logit Regression Analyses of Strategic Fit of Corporate InvestmentsObservations are investments
Did firm go public, register,
Did firm go public? or have favorable acquisition?
Age of firm at time of financing –0.02 [5.52] –0.02 [0.50] –0.02 [6.17] –0.02 [6.13]
Round number 0.13 [11.39] 0.13 [11.18] 0.13 [11.48] 0.13 [11.29]
Corporate venture investment? 0.15 [2.54] –0.19 [1.31] 0.12 [2.15] –0.23 [1.64]
Independent venture investment? –0.003 [0.09] –0.002 [0.07] 0.07 [2.54] 0.07 [2.56]
Corporate investment and strategic fit? 0.52 [3.15] 0.57 [3.55]
Firm based in California? 0.30 [9.29] 0.29 [8.96] 0.23 [7.44] 0.22 [6.98]
Firm based in Massachusetts? 0.36 [7.83] 0.36 [7.75] 0.24 [5.26] 0.23 [5.04]
Firm is in development stage? 0.44 [7.73] 0.42 [7.27] 0.38 [6.99] 0.35 [6.41]
Firm is in beta stage? 0.25 [2.83] 0.22 [2.50] 0.14 [1.60] 0.11 [1.24]
Firm is in shipping stage? 0.38 [6.28] 0.36 [5.95] 0.30 [5.20] 0.28 [4.82]
Firm is in profitable stage? 1.32 [17.08] 1.30 [16.61] 1.10 [14.77] 1.08 [14.27]
Firm is in restart stage? –0.56 [4.20] –0.56 [4.19] –0.43 [3.64] –0.45 [3.71]
Log likelihood –14,743.6 –14,252.0 –15,477.4 –14,973.7
χ2-statistic 2,409.9 2,362.4 2,065.5 2,025.7
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 24,515 23,740 24,515 23,740
Note: The sample in the first four regressions consists of 32,364 investments in privately held, venture-backed firms between 1983 and
1994; in the fifth and sixth regressions, the sample consists of 8,506 financing rounds of privately held, venture-backed firms between 1983
and 1994. The dependent variable in the first, second, fifth, and sixth regressions is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the
firm had gone public by the spring of 1998. In the third and fourth regressions, the dummy takes the value of one if the firm had gone public,
filed a registration statement, or been acquired at twice the postmoney valuation (in inflation-adjusted dollars) at the time of the investment
by the spring of 1998. Independent variables include the age of the firm at the time of the investment, the ordinal rank of the investment
round, and dummy variables denoting investments by corporate and independent venture capital funds, corporate venture investments where
there was a strategic fit with the portfolio firm, firms based in California and Massachusetts, the status of the firm at the time of the invest-
ment, the year of the investment (not reported), the industry of firm (not reported), and a constant (not reported). All dummy variables take
on the value of one if the answer to the posed question is in the affirmative. Absolute t-statistics are reported in brackets.
Source: VentureOne
Entire Corporate Independent Corporate VC
Status at end of analysis sample VC only VC only and strategic fit
Initial public offering completed 31.1 35.1 30.6 39.3
Registration statement filed 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.3
Acquired 29.0 29.0 30.3 27.5
Still privately held 20.6 21.1 19.7 18.3
Liquidated 18.7 14.6 18.7 14.7
Note: The sample consists of 32,364 investments in privately held venture-backed firms between 1983 and 1994. The table presents the
eventual outcome of the firms as a percentage of the sample. Separate tabulations are presented for investments by corporate venture
firms, corporate funds where there was a strategic fit between the parent and portfolio firms, and independent venture funds.
Source: VentureOne
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TABLE 6
Status of Corporate and Independent Venture Investments
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• They failed to build relationships and establish
credibility outside the corporation. (In many
instances, they assumed that the corporation’s
name alone would ensure success.) 
Solidifying internal cohesion. Many corpora-
tions plunge into corporate venturing without realiz-
ing that how they design the program matters. As a
result, conflict can arise over the program’s objec-
tives—and can even force the dissolution of the
effort. For instance, as discussed earlier, departments
that feel threatened by or otherwise uncomfortable
with the program might push to have it terminated.
Or the venture unit’s interests and the corporation’s
goals may be unaligned—for example, venture person-
nel are rewarded solely on financial return whereas
the corporation makes strategic goals a priority.
Exxon Enterprises, whose venture capital effort
ranks among the most spectacular failures in the
field, suffered the consequences of internal dissen-
sion.11 The oil giant (called Esso at the time), seeking
to diversify its product line, launched its venture
program in 1964. The program began with a mandate
to exploit technology in Exxon’s corporate labora-
tories: for example, making building materials out of
petroleum derivatives. 
In the late 1960s, however, the fund managers
decided to make minority investments in a wide
variety of industries, from advanced materials to
air-pollution-control equipment to medical devices.
In the late 1970s, the strategy changed yet again—
the program now focused solely on systems for
office use. Finally, in 1985, Exxon abandoned the
venture effort entirely. Each shift in corporate strat-
egy had brought on waves of costly write-downs.
The information-systems effort alone generated an
estimated $2 billion in losses for the corporation.
What explains this disaster? In part, the corpo-
rate venture team came to the project with scant
investment experience and made numerous poor
decisions. But equally important, senior managers
at Exxon could not agree on the program’s over-
arching purpose. Moreover, various divisions at
Exxon insisted on detailed reviews of the program.
These reviews consumed so much time that they
distracted the fund managers’ attention away from
the selection and oversight of investments. Mean-
while, various organizations within the corporation
had a hand in structuring the program. For
instance, Exxon’s human resources staff com-
plained that the venture firms’ compensation
schemes did not mirror those of the overall corpo-
ration. In the late 1970s, human resources succeeded
in replacing the venture staff’s separate stock-
firm had gone public, filed a registration with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (a prelim-
inary step before going public), or been acquired for
a valuation of at least twice the postmoney valuation
of the financing.10 As independent variables, I use the
age of the firm at the time of the investment and the
ordinal rank of the investment round. I also employ
dummy variables denoting investments by corporate
and independent venture capital funds, corporate
venture investments in which there was a strategic fit
with the portfolio firm, firms based in California and
Massachusetts, the status of the firm at the time of
the investment, the year of the investment, the indus-
try of the firm, and a constant. 
The results are consistent with the univariate
comparisons above. Corporate venture investments
are significantly more successful than other
investments. (In most of the regressions, inde-
pendent venture investments are also more suc-
cessful though the effect is smaller in magnitude
and statistical significance.) When the dummy
variable denoting corporate venture investments
with a strategic fit is added to the regressions,
the corporate venture dummy variable becomes
insignificant (and frequently negative). Corporate
venture investments in general do not perform
better—only those with a strategic fit. These
results seem consistent with the complementarities
hypothesis above.
A Clinical Look at the Corporate 
Venture Evidence
I
n addition to strategic fit, market knowledge, and
resources, the way a corporation approaches its
venture program influences its chances of success
(Siegel, Siegel, and MacMillan 1988; Sykes 1990). In
companies whose venture programs do not succeed,
managers have made two fatal mistakes:
• They never created consensus inside the organi-
zation about the program’s objectives and its
potential benefits to the company.
While corporate venture investing suffers
from many of the same problems that have
affected fads in venture capital investing as
a whole, corporate venture investments have
a successful track record.10. The postmoney valuation is defined as the product of the price paid per share in the financing round and the shares out-
standing after the financing round. In calculating the valuations, VentureOne converts all preferred shares into common
stock at the conversion ratios specified in the agreements. Warrants and options outstanding are included in the total as long
as their exercise price is below the price per share being paid in the financing round. 
The results are also robust to the use of a third dependent variable, the probability that the firm has not been liquidated
by the spring of 1998.
11. The discussion of Exxon Enterprises is based on the Venture Economics study cited above. 
12. The account of the Java Fund relies on Fisher (1996) and on <www.kpcb.com/keiretsu/initiative_old_list.php?initiative=10>. 
13. The BlueLight Fund is discussed in Chesbrough and Rotelli (2000). 
14. The eLoyalty Fund is documented in Leibowitz (2000).
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option schemes with a standard salary-plus-bonus
plan. An exodus of fund managers soon followed.
Internal consensus is particularly important in
venture programs with strong strategic objectives.
The $100 million Java Fund, launched in 1996 by
Kleiner, Perkins, Caufield & Byers, is one example
of a fund that gave a number of corporations a
chance to invest primarily for strategic reasons.12
The fund specifically invested in companies that
used Java, a programming language developed by
Sun Microsystems that runs on a wide variety of
operating systems and challenged Microsoft Windows.
In addition to raising capital from traditional limited
partners (such as the Harvard, Stanford, and Yale
University endowments), the fund also tapped firms
such as Cisco, IBM, Netscape, Oracle, and, of
course, Sun. Even though these firms competed
intensely with each other, they all wanted to see
this programming language take root because it
would level the playing field with their formidable
competitor Microsoft.
Cultivating external relationships. Good
relationships with independent venture firms are
also essential to the success of corporate programs.
Why? Particularly today, the venture capital busi-
ness is highly competitive. Identifying and gaining
access to attractive opportunities can be difficult
for new players. Meanwhile, investors have to make
decisions quickly, often with scant information
about an opportunity. Close ties between corporate
venture efforts and traditional venture firms can 
• bring promising opportunities to the corporate
fund’s attention, 
• bring early-stage transactions—which often have
lower valuations and more strategic potential—
to the corporate fund’s attention, 
• ensure that venture capitalists deal with corporate
capitalists professionally and respectfully, and
• let corporate groups tap into independent
groups’ knowledge. 
Despite all these potential benefits, relations
between corporate and independent venture groups
continue to be somewhat strained. The venture capi-
tal community is close-knit; many leading firms have
syndicated transactions with each other for decades.
Though these firms’ skepticism about corporate ven-
ture funds has abated somewhat, a residual amount
remains. Furthermore, unscrupulous venture groups
have been known to exploit naive corporate investors,
offering them overpriced investments or withholding
bad news about potential investees.
To make relationship building even more diffi-
cult, it takes time for corporations to build credi-
bility in the eyes of independent venture capitalists.
Many corporations launch venture programs
assuming that their names alone will earn them
instant respect. They then discover that their
venture program is not going anywhere without
“road shows” with venture groups, conference
presentations, and press releases to publicize the
company’s activities. 
There are several important lessons to be learned
from these accounts:
• Form an appropriately sized fund. Too small a
fund suggests a limited commitment by the cor-
poration to the program; too substantial an effort
leads to speculation that the corporation does not
understand the dangers associated with growing
too quickly. 
• Recruit one or more of the fund’s investment pro-
fessionals from the venture capital community.
• Articulate a clear investment strategy. 
• Simultaneously invest in venture capital partner-
ships specializing in similar technologies. 
• Consider joint ventures (1) with a specific ven-
ture capitalist firm (for instance, Softbank and
K-Mart formed a collaboration called BlueLight13),
(2) with several other corporations and a venture
capitalist firm (such as Kleiner Perkins’ Java
Fund), and (3) with a number of venture capi-
talist firms. (For instance, Sutter Hill Ventures,
Technology Crossover Ventures, and buyout fund
Bain Capital joined in mid-2000 with the con-
sulting firm eLoyalty to establish the eLoyalty
Ventures Fund.14)16 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2002
companies increases with early-stage companies.
Finally, the paper shows that corporate investments
are at least as successful as independent venture
capital investments. In addition, the probability of
success is substantially higher for corporate ven-
ture investments in related industries.
While corporate venture investing suffers from
many of the same problems that have affected fads
in venture capital investing as a whole, corporate ven-
ture investments have a successful track record. The
experience of recent corporate programs, many of
which have been initiated by companies that can
trace their own history to venture capital investments,
bodes well for the future of corporate venturing.
Conclusions
T
his paper has explored the experience of cor-
porations’ investments in young, entrepreneur-
ial firms. Historically, the media and academics have
maligned corporate investments in venture capital
and highlighted visible failures. This study, however,
finds quite a different result. Corporate venture
investments have waxed and waned in tandem with
the independent venture capital industry. Many
of today’s leading technology corporations are
extremely active in the sector. In addition, corpo-
rate venture capital groups have been increasingly
willing to invest in start-ups in related industries.
The probability of making investments in related
Investment Stages
Start-up: Company with a skeletal business
plan, product, or service development in prelim-
inary stages.
Development: Stage at which product or ser-
vice development is under way but the company
is not generating revenues from sales.
Beta: For companies specializing in informa-
tion technology, the phase at which the product is
being tested by a limited number of customers
but not available for broad sale. For life sciences
companies, beta is synonymous with a drug in
human clinical trials or a device being tested.
Shipping: The stage at which the product or
service is being sold to customers and the com-
pany is deriving revenues from those sales but
expenses still exceed revenues.
Profitable: The stage at which the company is
selling products or services and the sales revenue
yields a positive net income.
Restart: The stage at which the firm is recapi-
talized at a reduced valuation, accompanied by a
substantial shift in the product or marketing focus.
Industry Groups
Computer hardware: Firms whose primary
lines of business are personal computing, mini-
computers or workstations, mainframe computers,
CAD/CAM/CAE systems, data storage, computer
peripherals, memory systems, office automation,
source data collection, multimedia devices, and
computer networking devices.
Computer software: Firms whose primary
lines of business are compilers, assemblers, and
systems, applications, CAD/CAM/CAE/CASE
systems, recreational and home, artificial intel-
ligence, educational, multimedia software, and on-
line services.
Communications: Firms whose primary lines
of business include modems, computer network-
ing, fiber optics, microwave and satellite commu-
nications, telephone equipment, pocket paging,
cellular phones, radar and defense systems, tele-
vision equipment, teleconferencing, and television
and radio broadcasting.
Medical: Firms whose primary lines of busi-
ness include biotechnology, pharmaceuticals,
diagnostic imaging, patient monitoring, medical
devices, medical lab instruments, hospital equip-
ment, medical supplies, retail medicine, hospital
management, medical data processing, and med-
ical lab services.
Regions
Eastern United States: Firms whose head-
quarters are located in Connecticut, Delaware, the
District of Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and West
Virginia. 
Western United States: Firms whose head-
quarters are located in Alaska, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
APPENDIX
Definitions of Firm Categorizations
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